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This article presents lessons learned about the organisation and provision of
psychosocial support in terror-stricken European cities. The information is based on
the experiences of professionals directly involved in organising and providing
psychosocial support and of representatives from peer support organisations
(PSOs) formed in the aftermath of the terror events. These psychological
spokespeople were gathered for a workshop to discuss lessons learned. (See Method
section.) By describing the opportunities and difficulties in responding to these
events, we hope that future responses to terror events can be improved.
In the last decade, a series of terrorist attacks has taken place in various cities in
Europe (e.g., Paris, London, Manchester, Oslo). The terror has taken different forms,
from bomb explosions and vehicle-ramming attacks, to mass shootings and knife
stabbings. The casualties have varied widely from a few to more than a hundred
people killed as well as small to vast numbers of injured. While some situations
involved a single bomb explosion, others led people to hide or flee for hours to stay
alive. The degree of threat to life, the duration of the event, and the latency before
help arrived have thus varied, making the psychological toll on survivors, the
bereaved, helpers, bystanders, and the public diverse. The systems in place to assist
in the immediate and long-term phases have varied from country to country, both in
terms of medical emergency response (more homogeneous) and mounted
psychosocial response. Psychosocial support during emergencies usually refers to
interventions that aim to reduce psychological distress by attending to people’s
psychological and practical needs following a crisis or disaster event.
Responses must be understood in relation to context because different response
systems have developed separately in different countries (
). Despite these differences, similarities also exist due to
harmonisation through EU-regulations (Ibid.), and in March 2019, the new
legislation entered into force to strengthen financial and operational support,
including rescEU that represents reserve capacity for transnational help
( ). Terror events in major cities are
transnational because they affect people visiting from many countries. Thus, a high
demand exists for collaboration between professionals and systems in several
countries. Such collaboration would be achievable through good relations between
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the professionals involved and governmental authorities in charge of the follow-up.
Every terrorist attack represents possibilities for learning from the event which
could benefit the next city to face such an attack. This article sums up and discusses
lessons learned from the psychosocial responses following recent terrorist attacks in
European cities.
Method for extracting lessons learned
In 2018, the first author invited representatives from ten European cities that have
experienced terror since 2011. This includes all cities where the deadliest attacks
( ) took place. Participants from
two cities (Paris and Brussels) unfortunately could not take part. Representatives
from Oslo, Berlin, Barcelona, Turku, Nice, London, Stockholm, and Manchester
participated in the workshop in October 2018. Those present either had a central
role in organising the psychosocial follow-up or they represented peer support
organisations(PSOs) formed by those directly affected (user representatives).
Participants were sought through contacting NGOs, governmental organisations,
and people who had published about psychosocial follow-up in a terror-affected city
and from asking for persons central to the psychosocial organisation and follow-up.
Two representatives participated from most cities, but only a few cities had
established PSOs. Representatives for three PSOs were present. Ahead of the
workshop, representatives wrote a short “Lessons learned” summary (1 to 6 pages)
about the psychosocial response. During the workshop, two discussants (two first
authors) led a discussion that focused on three phases of follow-up: the immediate <
1 week; the intermediate (>1 week to 1–2 months), and the long-term (> 2 months).
The lengths of the immediate, intermediate, and long-term follow-up phases are
based on what participants usually indicated. Notes from the discussions and
lessons learned documents form the basis of this article. In addition, all participants
have had a chance to comment on this manuscript.
Lessons learned: Immediate response
The unpredictability and varied nature of the events made for a vast span of different
responses. The assistance had to be adjusted according to the situation, demanding
flexibility in where and how victims were met. Telephone hotlines, temporary next-
of-kin centres, or reception centres were set up but varied in where and how they
were organised. For example, after the Utøya terror, a nearby hotel was quickly
organised to help survivors and family members who gathered near the island. In
Turku, they also established reception centres for “it could have been me” groups. In
other situations, like in Barcelona and Stockholm, many people were trapped inside
shops, storerooms, and cafés, where they stayed for hours until the situation was
stable. In Barcelona, around 5,000 people were confined for at least five hours. In
Manchester, the families of the missing and presumed dead were gathered at a pre-
allocated Friends and Family Reception Centre at the local football stadium. They
were later accommodated in a hotel near the mortuary, where they waited for news
as to whether their family member had been identified as one of the deceased.
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Registration of affected persons was often impossible or haphazard under such
chaotic situations. To some extent, lack of registration at the outset was due to an
initial lack of registration facilities. Askenazy and co-workers ( ) described this
scenario as an “initial disorganisation of administrative procedures” when an influx
of patients were received at the emergency ward in Nice within the first hour
following the attack there. In such chaotic situations, reunifying family members
becomes a priority (to alleviate, for example, frantic parents searching for their
children). Professionals in Nice have therefore recommended a computerised data
processing system with trained personnel for registration in such contexts
( ).
Obtaining information about those affected was a recurrent problem in the
immediate phase. Such particulars ranged from information about missing family
members to information about what happened, where to receive help, etc.
Frustration and anger were observed among those desperately trying to locate their
family members. The Police Casualty Bureau helpline in Manchester, intended to
assist those looking for family members in the hours and days after the city’s
bombing, did not function as planned. The system from the telecommunications
network provider not working (
) gave rise to this dysfunction.
In several cities, the lack of registration of people added to the problems. When
information from authorities was insufficient, rumours flourished and people
depended on the media, though the reliability of this information varied. Privacy
matters restricted information sharing in hospitals and created problems for those
searching for details about their family members. Close collaboration between police
and those responsible for psychosocial care is necessary to secure close and regular
contact, which facilitates information flow in both directions. Such a joint effort
worked well in Manchester with the police sharing information with the statutory
NHS psychosocial provider of persons they were concerned about. In turn, the NHS
psychosocial responder directed potential witnesses to the police. An important part
of psychosocial care is to obtain verified information at the earliest possible time.
Information is needed on the current situation, on where to access up-to-date and
verified information, on where to receive help, on where to get assistance with
practical issues, and on the rights affected people have. Regularity in information
sharing with those affected, even if it does not add much to the factual knowledge
about the situation, contributes to a feeling that the authorities are in charge and
doing their utmost to support the families of the survivors and deceased.
In Stockholm, the terror highlighted the need for one permanent psychosocial
hotline number. Several cities noted the necessity for better registration forms to use
during the incident and thus improved their record-keeping procedures. It should be
remembered that registration of presence at an attack may become an issue later if
problems arise as a consequence of exposure (e.g., regarding legal or insurance
matters). In the Swedish capital, a need also existed for different language versions
of information leaflets available. Social media became both a blessing and a
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challenge, making it possible for people who got separated to renew contact. But it
also created additional shocks for people who understood that their family members
were dead based on photographs circulating on the Internet. In such situations,
extensive use of social media can also add to the stress of the situation (
).
Lack of coordination was the major problem encountered in many of the cities that
were terrorised. When terror is transnational, coordination of help becomes crucial.
One example of how problematic this synchronisation can be arose when a team was
flown in from an outside country to help people from a particular organisation from
the team members’ home country. The local authorities tried to engage members of
this team to help translate for other citizens from their homeland but they declined
because they were there only to help their own organisation.
The problems with coordination must be seen in light of the number of affected
people. In Nice, for example, it was estimated that 50,000 people were in the street
where the terrorists’ truck hit pedestrians. In Barcelona, there were 15 causalities
but a total of 1,200 people were assisted with acute stress responses. In Manchester,
more than 15,000 people were present at the concert the terrorists targeted.
While available crisis contingency plans may be made at different levels (i.e., from
the government, from county councils, and from local municipalities), the
knowledge of such plans varies, making coordination and collaboration difficult. If
one adds the variations of different names, concepts, and terms used in these plans,
collaboration and effective crisis support are further impeded. The level of response
is also directly related to the amount and regularity of exercise, both tabletop and in
vivo exercises. In the case of Utøya, Hole municipality had an emergency plan in
place as well as an updated overview of the collective resources available in both
municipal and specialised services.
The use of translators becomes a necessity when different nationalities are present.
Planning how to deal with different languages must be part of every disaster plan.
The psychological toll on translators can be heavy, especially when they are not
trained or used to encountering people in emergencies. Preplanning of contact with
embassies and consulates, and preferably a meeting in advance to clarify roles, will
ease future collaboration. This foresight can secure support for victims from their
home country. In several of the terrorised cities, it was unclear who would cover
travel costs for close relatives to visit the injured or be with their dead loved ones.
In some cities, collaboration was strained between crisis centres and hospitals,
making it difficult for interaction to take place between injured and uninjured
survivors. In several affected cities, overlooked groups were identified (e.g., foreign
visitors, asylum seekers with a previous history of trauma, witnesses and “it could
have been me” groups, and people who had been in contact with the perpetrators
before the terrorist attack). Where children and adolescents were survivors or
victims, the need to provide for them and their families from the start was
emphasised (cf. ). However, children may be difficult to reach
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and preplanning on how to achieve influence over them would be helpful. In such
cases, outreach becomes paramount. Manchester psychosocial responders provided
information and support to schools and colleges in addition to performing direct
child and family work. Advice to parents with children was also provided, which
included the importance of maintaining regular routines, in Nice for example
( ).
The number of volunteers and informal helpers was highly valuable in many cities
but also represented a problem in the immediate phase. Coordination became
difficult, even impossible, due to the lack of both a lead agency and a strategy for
how to make use of those who volunteered. In several impacted cities, the sheer
magnitude of helpers arriving became a problem because their skills did not always
match what was needed. In some cases, the volunteers had inappropriate, harmful,
and/or exploitative approaches (e.g., deep emotional conversations with survivors
right after the event) and caution regarding such approaches should be made during
future terror events. Also, too many volunteers strain the system, with irritation
growing among them if there is no role to fill. A system needs to be set up ahead of
time to ensure better coordination, regulation, and use of resources. A lead agency
for volunteers is strongly recommended.
Interaction and coordination of psychosocial and medical assistance, including the
chain of command, can also prove challenging. Regarding psychosocial first aid,
involved personnel should possess basic knowledge of how to help.
Informal helpers are not part of a professional organisation or non-governmental
organisation (NGO) that has a system in place to follow up with its personnel
afterwards. In the immediate phase, registration must be in place for all involved
helpers to facilitate later contact. After several of the terror events, critiques have
been made regarding follow-up on the voluntary helpers. From studies, we know
that such helpers are usually worse off than professional helpers (
). In many of the affected cities, helpers were
taxed during the initial phase, making it difficult for them to step back. That is
because the “high” of being part of important work can prompt them to overextend
themselves. A maximum number of volunteer hours or days has to be set by leaders
and not by individual choice.
The involvement of the government following the terrorist attacks varied. In
Norway, the government developed a national model in close collaboration with
support groups, professional experts, and different organisations representing
professions and communities, among others. However, this approach mainly
affected the intermediate and long-term follow-up. A small community held
responsibility for the immediate intervention following the Utøya killings. This
scenario tested personnel in the early phase, and the government had to step in to
supplement resources. The level, or lack, of governmental involvement also caused
resentment in other cities and is an issue that should be given attention to reduce
additional stress in future acute situations. There is also high symbolic value in
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having political and/or royal leaders provide national recognition by visiting the
scene of the terror event and meeting both those affected and their helpers.
No internationally recognised protocol exists for how to care for people in the
immediate phase. The role is different from ordinary work at hospital wards or in
the community due to the sheer intensity and number of victims. As Askenazy and
co-workers ( ) write, “… mental health professionals should know how to
simultaneously promote safety, calming, and positive emotions, without being
intrusive or appearing judgmental. They should also assess the need for a more
formal therapeutic intervention and its degree of urgency” (p. 7). Such situations
demand both proper training and preparation as well as follow-up after the work is
done.
While some of the groups affected by the terror are easy to identify, there are other
more “hidden” groups. After the bomb explosion in Oslo, for instance, a group that
experienced “survivor guilt” was those not at work when the bomb was detonated. In
Barcelona, three hidden groups were identified: a) illegals living in Barcelona who
were reluctant to seek help; b) the community where the terrorists came from,
including those who had worked with them; and c) the spontaneous helpers who
provided first aid. This last group felt hurt by not being invited to memorial services
and receiving no medals or recognition. At Utøya, the spontaneous helpers on board
boats, who took part in rescuing youths in the water, had similar feelings of being
overlooked. In Turku, a group of people who felt like “it could have been me” also
required help, and the amount of witnesses in some terrorised cities was high. Also,
in some cities it was reported that people in the Muslim communities were afraid of
leaving their homes due to threats, violence, and hate crimes perpetrated by people
blaming all Muslims for the attacks.
Lessons learned: Intermediate response
The intermediate and long-term responses overlap. In several cities, planning
started early to secure psychosocial follow-up over time. In Norway, for example, the
government had the ambition to develop a national model and gathered
representatives from the school sector, trade unions, health services, county
governors, municipalities, NGOs, and PSOs. The chosen officials mounted a
proactive outreach with input from professional centres involved in grief, trauma
work, and research ( ). Since those gathered at Utøya came from all over
Norway, municipalities around the country were given a primary role in establishing
contact with the affected families. The government also supported capacity building
within mental health services to meet the new demands, and gatherings for
personnel from affected schools were arranged to support the assistance efforts.
Thus, the government, through the Norwegian Directorate of Health, assumed an
organisational role in the intermediate phase to secure follow-up over time. By
enlisting agencies from many sectors of Norwegian society, government officials
assured that a consensus existed about the help being planned and offered.
The support group formed by survivors and the bereaved could correct the remote
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perspective and provide the government with a more realistic or updated picture of
the situation. Both then and in later follow-up, the feedback from the PSO was
invaluable in ensuring that those who struggled received qualified help. In Norway,
the PSO formed after the terrorist attack has continued to play an important part in
making the government more aware and in prompting an adjustment in follow-up of
both survivors and the bereaved. Although the communities themselves have stated
that their systems worked well, the PSO’s user perspective has been an important
corrective voice, bringing forward information that the situation was not as
optimistic as the authorities perceived it to be.
Although they were met with respect and acquired contacts in the community,
health services did not meet the problems arising over time that required more
trauma- and grief-specific follow-up (
). Many young students moved from their home to university cities,
experiencing a lack of coordination of services following their relocation. The PSO
identified such issues and worked with the authorities to improve the matter.
However, to our knowledge, few European cities that have experienced terror have
had formal organisations (PSOs) formed to care for the user perspective. In the
future, we would recommend authorities to support the establishment of such
initiatives. A suggested framework for accomplishing this aim could be a formalised
agreement to support the establishment of a peer group with a credible third party.
In Norway, the Directorate of Health has had, for many years, such an agreement
with the Norwegian Red Cross.
People affected by terrorist attacks often express a strong desire and need to meet
others in the same situation. Peer Support Organisations can meet such needs and
can mobilise mutual aid. Together, they form a shared identity with strengths and
resources they do not have alone ( ). Peer support, involving group
facilitation by professionals, was also organised following the Manchester bombing,
whereby people meet in groups across northern UK.
The hand-over from those involved in immediate help to those responsible for
intermediate and long-term follow-up proved problematic in several regards. This
snag resulted partly from a lack of good preparation and plans, which accounted for
psychosocial issues, but also because registration was inadequate and ascertaining
that an individual or family required follow-up was difficult. When different
authorities held responsibility for immediate follow-up and long-term follow-up,
problems ensued. The objectives and purpose of each authority’s involvement
differed and, to some extent, each one held different views or mental models (
) of what was needed, making good hand-
over and collaboration difficult. In several countries, plans were underway to
improve this situation based on difficulties experienced during previous disasters.
For example, in Barcelona, a better care system had already evolved as a
consequence of the Germanwings Flight 9525 crash in 2015. This plane departed
from Barcelona en route to Düsseldorf, Germany. All 150 on board were killed, many
hailing from Catalunya, Spain. Another problem arising in several cities was that
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although contingency plans were available, they were not well known to the
responders.
In many of the cities, it was hard to reach the affected populations with information
regarding where support or crisis counselling could be obtained. This challenge was
especially prevalent with children and young people. In Stockholm, a suggestion was
made that complimentary information channels (e.g., websites) should be
established to reach young people. Also, several participants pointed out that the
family perspective was lacking and that divorced families and different family
constellations were challenging.
In Barcelona, 200 trained volunteers were given basic training regarding individual
reactions to help them screen those in need of follow-up. Employees in pharmacies
were informed of referral possibilities and how to gently steer people toward follow-
up resources. In Manchester, everyone who purchased tickets for the concert (i.e.,
the scene of the terrorist attack) were outreached to and invited to engage in an
online well-being screening process. Such screening would repeat regularly for the
first three years following the attack to monitor those affected. This process enabled
those scoring within the clinical range to receive additional telephone triage calls
and onward referral into evidence-based treatments close to where they lived. It
also, however, exposed discrepancies in waiting times across the different regions of
the UK.
Capacity building (i.e., increasing health professionals’ knowledge about trauma and
grief) took place in several cities. This consisted of presentations and videos on the
web, in addition to reaching out to the general public through e-learning tools
(Barcelona). This outreach was done through formal trainings and information
meetings directly organised by the government as well as through sponsorship of
trainings by professional organisations (Oslo). One issue that arose was that the
stressing of “normal reactions” kept people from seeking help, leaving some
struggling with traumatic reactions over time before realising they needed
psychological support. In light of this issue, a stepped care approach seems to be
necessary.
Lessons learned: Long-term response
The need for and content of a follow-up model in the long-term phase was stressed
by several professional representatives. The discussion revolved around issues like
responsibility, duration of follow-up, screening at different points in time, the needs
of subgroups (children, adults, helpers, etc.), and professional versus peer support.
The need for more research on which models to follow was highlighted. By collecting
and sharing data on psychosocial responses across cities, for example by developing
a systematic gathering of lessons learned in this field, more knowledge would be
available to improve long-term follow-up.
In almost all cities, the professional representatives pointed out that they found the
immediate response to be better that the long-term response. Structures were not in
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place, and the different needs of survivors, the bereaved, witnesses, and helpers all
contributed to problems in organising a long-term response.
Memorials and commemoration of the terror event differed across cities. Although
people spontaneously found a shared place to lay flowers and mementos following
the events, in some places these items had to be moved (e.g., moving the flowers on
the Las Ramblas in Barcelona to a different location). A strategy for what to do with
flowers, toys, drawings, etc.  placed at the spontaneous memorial locales where the
terror happens must be made in advance. There is also a need for people to visit or
return to the scene, which requires coordination and organisation. In Manchester,
an in-door filming of the site made a virtual visit to the scene possible for the
victims, survivors, and bereaved. Following the Utøya killings, several papers were
published about both the alleviation and the hardships that arose from visiting the
site ( ; ).
Over time, the placement of more permanent memorials became conflictual in some
locations, reflecting different opinions between and within the affected groups.
Letting representatives of those directly affected be part of the process was a
recommendation from several cities. The people living close to the suggested site for
a memorial, like voluntary helpers at Utøya, protested the chosen site because they
feared it would serve as a constant reminder. Others, bereaved and survivors,
however, felt the selected place was where it had to be because it was close to where
the event took place. Spending time and consulting with all parties involved is
needed to reduce undue conflict. The process should also take into account that
some spokespersons for those affected by terror might be very insistent and make
consensus difficult to reach, without necessarily representing the entire group.
The same principles of consultation with the directly affected need to be applied for
anniversary commemoration events. Such rituals constitute an important part of
psychosocial care. They also offer an opportunity for social validation of the loss and
suffering that took place. It is especially important to include those directly affected
who were missed in the initial phase, such as the voluntary helpers or uninjured
survivors.
The collaboration between private and public healthcare professionals has the
potential for improvement. The use of different names, concepts, and terms within
planning documents has caused problems not only between the private and the
public sectors but also among different governmental/public agencies that operate
with their own terminology. Shared mental models would facilitate collaboration
and coordination in the long-term phase. While plans for immediate responses were
usually in place, long-term follow-up was less well planned for. Proper long-term
follow-up demands systematic registration (which was not always in place),
screening for referral, and clear responsibilities among cooperating agencies. It also
requires knowledge about each other’s responsibility and competency areas. Without
proactivity in these areas, those in need may go without proper intervention or
treatment. Although the percentage of victims needing long-term follow-up may be
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relatively low, the sheer number of people directly exposed to terror may make the
actual number in need of follow-up very high (cf. 40,000 present in Nice). In the
first year following the Manchester Arena Attack, more than 2,500 people were
helped by the NHS psychosocial support service. Financial arrangements and
healthcare systems that secure access to qualified services need to be set up to
respond to such demands.
A combination of exposure factors (life-threat, duration of time in lockdown, viewing
dead and mutilated bodies), social factors (social support available), and history
(previous loss and/or trauma and previous psychiatric history) can be used to
determine the need for follow-up. Several measures have been developed to screen
people in disaster/terror situations ( ). Because those directly
affected come from different parts of a country or from foreign countries, they are
spread over a large geographical area. Outreach efforts and proper follow-up are
therefore difficult and have, unfortunately, failed in many instances. Systems,
including collaboration with embassies, may have to be established in the event of
future terrorist attacks. While in some countries (UK) families are assigned a
caseworker, it is unclear how such assistance is secured with residents of other
countries. Local reception centres could be one way of reaching affected populations
when they return to their home countries, and online registration, information, and
support might also be helpful in this respect.
One issue for long-term follow-up that arose was the collective fear spreading
throughout the community, which was partly instigated by the intensive mass media
coverage. Besides the clinical needs of those directly involved, it is a pressing issue to
find ways to counteract such fear. This combatting of fear consists not only of
providing accurate and early information to the public but also advising the public
on how to resume normal activity, including making use of the spaces/places where
the terror took place. Just assuming a “we are not afraid” stance is not enough to
counteract self-imposed restrictions on movement and loss of personal safety and
trust. It is important to work actively in making people feel safe and encouraging
them to return to a more normal life. A special consideration is how to talk with
children to reduce unnecessary worry in them ( ).
The advice given should be easily accessible and delivered to different target groups,
taking into consideration their native language and digital literacy. Also, there is a
need for governmental and collective efforts to avoid prejudice and hate crimes
against political, religious, and ideological groups and to ensure tolerance,
integration, and a sense of connectedness between communities.
Media coverage was an issue in all three phases dealt with. In the acute phase, some
people stated that they felt “haunted” by the media. Efforts need to be made to
protect victims and vulnerable people from this pressure. Over time, affected groups
were given advice on limiting their exposure to the media coverage (Oslo, Nice,
Manchester). For example, written guidelines were provided before the court case
following the Oslo terror on both exposure to news media and interaction with the
media.
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The importance of caring for helpers was addressed by most cities’ representatives.
However, measures taken to achieve this aim varied. Following both the Nice and
Oslo terror events, group debriefings were used to help personnel deal with and
reflect on their work and roles. In both these places, psychologists and psychiatrists
served as group leaders. Although the great majority of helpers cope well following
such events, terror can involve extreme exposure to vivid impressions in the
immediate phase. Adequate follow-up of helpers may help sustain their dedication
and health over time.
Concluding remarks
This article presents the experience of professionals involved in organising and
providing psychosocial support and representatives of the “users” of these support
services. Even though the terrorist attacks were diverse across different cities,
several common lessons were learned that can benefit the response following future
terrorist attacks.
Leadership and chain of command must be as clearly defined in the psychosocial
area as they are for emergency responders, with systems in place for early
registration of affected people. Crisis contingency plans that include the psychosocial
response should be regularly exercised to ascertain good psychosocial crisis
management in the immediate, intermediate, and long-term phases.
Most terror events involve large numbers of people with a huge need for
information, especially those desperately desiring information regarding their loved
ones. Easily accessible, regular, updated, and verified information must be available
for affected groups. Such information demands good coordination, cooperation, and
exchange between different agencies.
The number of people and groups affected and
the convergence of helpers put heavy demand on
coordination within and between agencies.
Systems must ensure good coordination,
regulation, and use of human and material
resources. While major affected groups are easy
to identify, there can be several “hidden groups”
(e.g., bystanders, spontaneous helpers, and
people who were inadvertently in contact with
terrorists) who also require that their
psychosocial needs are met.
Peer support organisations can play an
important role in the wake of a terrorist attack. Such organisations represent a
resource that provides those in charge of psychosocial follow-up with an updated
and realistic picture of people’s needs. The government can play an important role in
the formation and maintenance of such groups and organisations. It is
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recommended that the long-term follow-up is planned for shortly after the terror
event. That is because a recurring problem in follow-up has been the gap between
early response and long-term follow-up.
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